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The Definition Of A Security Under The
California Corporate Securities Law Of

1968: The Risk Capital Test
In order to afford broad investor protection,1 the California Corporate Securities Law of 19682 requires that all transactions involving "offers" or "sales" of "securities" in California be qualified with the Com-

missioner of Corporations unless specifically exempted.' Although
there are problems of definition and application regarding each of the
noted terms,4 the persistent puzzle in the issue of qualification is the
definition of a security under California law.5 The term "security," as
pertinent to the securities law, was first defined by the California Legis-

lature in the Corporate Securities Act of 1917. 6 That definition has been
amended and reenacted throughout subsequent revisions of the securi-

ties law and is currently codified in section 25019 of the California Corporations Code,7 which embraces the Corporate Securities Law of
1968.
1. See, e.g., Maner v. Mydland, 250 Cal. App. 2d 526, 530, 58 Cal. Rptr. 740,
742 (1967); Hargiss v. Royal Air Properties, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 2d 406, 412, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 678, 682 (1962); Craft v. Brooks, 204 Cal. App. 2d 187, 188, 22 Cal. Rptr. 68,
69 (1962).
2. CAL. CORP. CODE §§25000-25804.
3. 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNA CORPORATION lAWS §435.01,
at 849 (4th ed. 1975).
4. See Bickford, California Corporate Securities Law of 1968: Some Interpretations, Some Problem Areas, 2 PAC. L.J. 497 (1971).
5. See, e.g., People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951); Domestic &
Foreign Petroleum Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); People v. Witzerman,
29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972); People v. Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d
286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968); Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421,
41 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1964); Oil Lease Serv., Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100,
327 P.2d 628 (1958); People v. Jaques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955);
People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d 882 (1949); Hollywood State Bank
v. Wilde, 70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 160 P.2d 846 (1945).
6. CAL. STATS. 1917, c.532, §2(6) (a), at 674.
7. CAL. CoR. CODE §25019 provides in part:
"Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; membership in an incorporated or unincorporated association; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement;
collateral trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment contract; voting trust certificate; certificate of deposit
for a security; certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas or mining
title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease; any
beneficial interest or other security issued in connection with a funded employees' pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or similar benefit plan; or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
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Although section 25019 includes within its definition such conventional securities as stocks, bonds, and debentures, other less conventional securities such as "investment contracts" and "evidences of indebtedness" are also included. These latter, more variable securities
have apparently been included within the definitional section to insure
a certain degree of flexibility in the application of section 25019 to
those interests which possess the basic characteristics of a security; however, the inclusion of these inherently vague terms has also created confusion as to whether a given document will be characterized as a security. The practitioner, faced with a qualification decision which could
involve rather serious consequences to his client,8 generally has little
difficulty identifying the conventional securities contained within section 25019. To the extent that the subject of the practitioner's qualification decision falls squarely within that section's terminology, presumably there will be little uncertainty that qualification will be required.
However, if the particular qualification issue relates to a borderline application of the statute concerning one of the less conventional and
more variable forms of a security which are not as readily identifiable,
there arises the necessity of interpretation and, with that necessity, at
least the potential of uncertainty. In such a situation the careful practitioner should request an interpretive opinion from the Commissioner
of Corporations pursuant to section 25618 of the Corporations Code
to determine whether or not qualification is required.
Although an interpretive opinion of the Commissioner, which construes the definitional section, is entitled to its appropriate weight, it does
not carry the force and effect of binding law for either the Commissioner
or the judiciary.9 Rather, in the absence of clearly expressed legislative
intent resolving these potential identification problems, regardless of the
manner in which litigation is initiated, the final word on the construction
of the definition of a security lies with the judiciary itself. 10 Before 1961
California courts utilized an "expectation of profits" rationale, which
was also the basis of federal case law," as the test to determine whether a
document could be characterized as one of certain interests included
within the statutory definition of a security.' 2 However, in the 1961 decireceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing. All of the foregoing are securities whether or not evidenced
by a written document ....
8. See Corporations Code Sections 25530-25542 for the consequences that may
result from the failure to qualify a transaction which falls within the purview of the securities law.
9. Corporations Code Section 25609 would potentially subject any action taken
by the Commissioner pursuant to an interpretive opinion to judicial review.
10. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
11. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
12. See authorities cited note 39 infra.
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sion of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,13 the California Supreme
Court significantly departed from prior case law by devising the concept
4
of "risk capital" as a means of defining a security under California law.1
Although the Silver Hills court enunciated this new concept, it failed to
specifically identify the passage of the opinion which embodied the definition of risk capital itself or the extent to which that concept was to be
used. This absence of a definitive interpretation of risk capital stifled the
development of a uniform definition of either the concept or a security in
subsequent securities cases.15 Recently, however, a step towards uniformity was taken when a California appellate court, in Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corporations,' attempted to clarify the definitions
of risk capital and security under California law. In light of the recent
Hamilton decision, grounded in the discipline of Silver Hills, this comment will analyze the definition of a security under the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968.
Because of the similarity of the statutory definitions of a security under the federal and California acts, this comment will commence with an
examination of the methods of regulation of the two acts, the judicially
constructed "expectation of profits" test for the definition of a security
under federal statutory law, and the extent to which that federal precedent could be used as a potential basis for the construction of California's statutory definition. In light of the divergent methods of regulation
and the jurisdictional limitations of the federal act, the comment will
then analyze in detail the Silver Hills decision in an attempt to precisely
identify the California Supreme Court's designation of the specific, regulatory purpose of the California law and its enunciation of the concept
of risk capital. In the course of this analysis, it will become apparent that
commentators have found Silver Hills fraught with ambiguity, and within that ambiguity, have formulated several alternative touchstones of
judicial analysis. One avenue of thought proceeds on the assumption
that California has rejected the federal standard used to define a security
and applied solely the risk capital criteria found in Silver Hills; the other
assumes that California applies the federal standard as an alternate or a
supplement to the risk capital criteria. However, under either approach
there seems to be one common source of disagreement-that is, the ap13. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
14. Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
15. See, e.g., People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284
(1972); Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); People v.
Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968); Sarmento v. Arbax Packing
Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1964); Craft v. Brooks, 204 Cal. App.
2d 187, 22 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1962).
16. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
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propriate definition of risk capital. As it appears that the recent Hamilton decison may have resolved some of the uncertainties stemming
from the Silver Hills decision, the comment in its final section will set
forth what appears to be the current California approach in defining a
security under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968. However, it will
leave for the reader, other commentators, and perhaps the legislature
itself, the question of whether this latest judicial gloss upon the securities law is a step forward in the process of meaningful, but realistic,
investor protection.
THE CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS

Although the basic purpose of all securities acts is to afford general
investor protection, 17 the method of achieving that purpose varies with
the type of act involved. As noted securities commentators H. Ballantine
and G. Sterling have pointed out in their treatise on California corporation laws, there are four basic types of regulatory acts: fraud acts, licensing acts, disclosure acts, and regulatory or "merit" acts. 8 The Federal
Securities Act of 1933 is basically a "disclosure act."' 9 As enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court: "The design of the act is to protect
investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary
to informed investment decision."" The federal act does not attempt to
directly shield the investing public from unsound or marginal securities
transactions by permitting the Securities and Exchange Commission
any discretion in denying registration in the presence of full and adequate disclosure;21 rather, "[t]he aim is to prevent further exploitation
of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities
through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor; .

",22

In contrast to the federal act, the California Corporate Securities Law
of 1968 is basically a "merit" act which is designed to shield the public
from unjust, unfair, or inequitable issuances of securities. 3 Specifically,
17. 2 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERL No, CALIOxRNm. COROrMON LAWS, §433, at
844-46 (4th ed. 1975).
18. See id.
19. S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir.
1973).
20. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
21. This philosophy led President Roosevelt to comment in his address urging the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933, "[t]here is, however, an obligation upon us to
insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
22. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
23. CAL. CoRP. CODE §25140.
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section 25140 of the California Corporations Code provides that the
Commissioner of Corporations may refuse to issue a permit for qualification, or may revoke or suspend any permit, if the "proposed issuance
or sale of securities is not fair, just, or equitable." 24 Hence, California
law would appear to go beyond the "full" disclosure requirements of the
federal act, since section 25140 allows the Commissioner to reject or
revoke any means of qualification for a transaction, even in the absence
of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment.
As a result of the specific method of regulation utilized under a given
securities act, the particular statutory or regulatory purpose of that act
should first be considered before any judicial construction of a specific
provision is undertaken. In the case of the federal act, this "statutory"
purpose was considered in the 1946 decision of S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey
Co.25 In that landmark securities case the United States Supreme Court
devised what is now generally known as the "expectation of profits"
test to identify an "investment contract," 6 one of the terms included
within both the federal and California statutory definitions of a security.2 In Howey, the W.J. Howey Company, a Florida corporation, was
engaged in a program to sell tracts of orange groves coupled with an optional service contract with a sister corporation. Under the optional
service contract, the Howey-in-the-Hills Service Corporation was to
maintain and harvest the trees and share in the profits of the citrus
groves with the investor-purchasers. The purchasers were generally
nonresidents of Florida who lacked the knowledge, skill, and equipment necessary for the care, maintenance, and harvest of the citrus
trees, but who were nevertheless attracted to the scheme by the expectation of profits.28
In finding that the scheme involved offers for the sale of securities in
the form of investment contracts under the Federal Securities Act of
1933,29 the Court set forth the four-pronged Howey test, defining an
investment contract as "[1] an investment of money [2] in a common
enterprise [3] with profits to come [4] solely from the efforts of others."'30 The Court found that this test permitted the "fulfillment of the
statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure,"'" and further
24. Id.

25. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

26. Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing at 22, Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of
Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing].
27. 15 U.S.C. §77b(l) (1970); CAL. CoRn. CODE §25019.
28. 328 U.S. 293. 294-96 (1946).
29. Id. at 298.
30. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
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stated that "[i]f the test be satisfied, it is immaterial whether the enter-

prise is speculative or nonspeculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic value." 32 Subsequent federal decisions have
eliminated the "solely" requirement in an effort to minimize the me33
chanical application of the test.
Even though California courts are not bound by federal law or judicial precedent because of the jurisdictional limitations of the federal
act,, 4 it has been argued that despite the differences in the methods of
regulation and thus potentially the regulatory purposes of the federal
and California securities acts, federal judicial precedent is an appropri-

ate basis for the construction of the definition of a security under California law. 35 This argument stems from the facial similarity of the definitions of a security contained within the California and federal acts," the
use of the federal act as a model by the draftsmen of the California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 37 and the similar identificational problems which have occurred at the California and federal levels.38 On the
basis of this assertion, it would seem that the federal Howey test could be
an appropriate means of defining a security under California law. As to
this potential use of federal law, early California judicial decisions had in
fact utilized an "expectation of profits" rationale,39 similar to the later
developed federal Howey test. 40 However, the courts involved took that
rationale primarily from the Blue Sky decisions of other state courts, 4'
just as the Court in Howey did. 42 Even during the period between the
32. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
33. S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479-83 (5th Cir. 1974);
S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973).
34. United States Code Title 15, Section 77e provides in part that the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 regulates only those offers, sales, or changes in rights
of a security which are transacted by utilizing the mails or any other means or instrument of transportation or communication of interstate commerce; whereas, under section
25008 of the California Corporations Code, the California securities law governs only
those offers and sales which occur in California.
35. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
36. Compare 15 U.S.C. §77b(1) (1970) with CAL. CORP. CODE §25019.
37. 2 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SaCURITIES LAw, Appendix A-1-88, Draftsmen's Commentary to §25019 (rev. ed. 1975).
38. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Oil Lease Serv.,
Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 327 P.2d 628 (1958).
39. See, e.g., People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 603 (1951);
People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 684-85, 91 P.2d 892, 894 (1939); Domestic & Foreign Petroleum Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 555, 51 P.2d 73, 76 (1935); Oil Lease Serv.,
Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 109, 327 P.2d 628, 633 (1958); People v.
Jaques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 833-35, 291 P.2d 124, 129-30 (1955); People v. Hoshor,
92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 253, 206 P.2d 882, 884 (1949); Hollywood State Bank v. Wilde,
70 Cal. App. 2d 103, 109, 160 P.2d 846, 848-49 (1945).
40. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
41. See, e.g., People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 686-88, 91 P.2d 892, 895-96
(1939); Domestic & Foreign Petroleum Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 556, 51 P.2d 73,
76 (1935); People v. Jaques, 137 Cal. App. 2d 823, 834-35, 291 P.2d 124, 131 (1955).
42. 328 U.S. 293, 298, citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52,
56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920).
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Howey and the Silver Hills decisions, California courts applying the "expectation of profits" rationale did not cite the federal landmark case. 43
Nevertheless, this factor alone would not preclude the utilization of the
federal precedent in current California securities cases, the federal rationale being essentially the same as that used in the earlier California
decisions.
JUDIcIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 25008:
SILVER HILLS COUNTRY CLUB V. SOBIESKI

Prior to 1961 California courts had identified certain unconventional
documents as securities if there had been an investment of capital with
the expectation of deriving a profit or income through the efforts of others.44 However, in 1961, when confronted with a unique factual situation in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski,45 the California Supreme

Court reexamined the purpose of the California corporate securities law
and its section defining a security and enunciated a concept to identify a
security and to effectuate the court's interpretation of the law's purpose. 46
In Silver Hills the petitioners had solicited capital for the development
of a country club. In order to acquire the land for the club, the petitioners entered into a land-sale contract for the purchase of a 22-acre parcel
at a price of $75,000. The contract called for a payment of $400 down,
$50,000 eighteen months from the date of the contract, and $1,000
monthly commencing three years from the date of the contract.4 7 After
the payment of the initial $400, the petitioners sowed grass, installed a
swimming pool, and remodeled the main house. Further improvements
were planned for the future. Although only part of the capital for these
improvements came from the sale of memberships in the prospective
club, the venture, which had not been underwritten, appeared to be
grossly undercapitalized since the petitioners had paid only the $400
down payment when the lower court proceedings were initiated.48 In
light of the financial structure of the club and the potential risk of loss
to the investor-members, California's Commissioner of Corporations
concluded that a membership in the proposed club constituted a "bene43. See People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951); Oil Lease Serv., Inc.
v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 327 P.2d 628 (1958); People v. Jaques, 137 Cal.
App. 2d 823, 291 P.2d 124 (1955); People v. Hoshor, 92 Cal. App. 2d 250, 206 P.2d
882 (1949).
44. See Oil Lease Serv., Inc. v. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 2d 100, 109, 327 P.2d
628, 633 (1958).
45. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
46. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
47. Id. at 812, 361 P.2d at 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
48. Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
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ficial interest in the title to property" and was therefore a security as
4
then defined by section 25008 of the California Corporations Code. 9
Since the memberships had been offered and sold without qualification,
as required by the Code, the Commissioner issued a "Desist and Refrain Order" directing the petitioners to stop the sales of the memberships; the petitioners in turn sought a writ of mandate to compel the
Commissioner to vacate the order. 0
A.

The RegulatoryPurpose of the CorporateSecuritiesLaw

Just as the Howey Court determined that the federal act has a particular "statutory" or regulatory purpose, the California act also has such a
purpose. In order to determine whether or not the memberships in Silver
Hills Country Club were within the legislative contemplation of the securities act, the Silver Hills court centered its attention on and undertook
a reassessment of the articulation of the specific, "regulatory" purpose of
the Corporate Securities Law,"1 that is, the purpose which would be particularly warranted under California's merit-type act.
In evaluating this purpose, the court cited People v. Syde,52 an earlier
California decision which had held that "the . . . purpose of the
[securities] law is to protect the public against . . . unsubstantial, un-

lawful and fraudulent stock and investment schemes and the securities
based thereron." 53 The court also noted the California Corporations
Commissioner's contention that the purchase of the memberships was
"attended by the very risks the corporate securities act was designed to
minimize. 5' 4 It would seem that the court utilized this additional insight
into the nature of the California securities law by the Commissioner
along with the decision in Syde for its finding that the regulatory purpose
of the California securities act was to protect those who risk their capital
and to insure that such investments take place only in legitimate ventures.5 5

In furtherance of this purpose, the Silver Hills court characterized the
purpose of the definitional section as follows: "Section 25008 defines a
security broadly to protect the public against spurious schemes, however
ingeniously devised, to attract risk capital."50 Since the court concluded
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
added).
55.
56.

Id. at 813-14, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
Id. at 813, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951).
Id. at 768, 235 P.2d at 603.
55 Cal. 2d 811, 813-14, 361 P.2d 906, 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187 (emphasis
Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (emphasis added).

1975 / The Risk Capital Test
that the act extended its protection to schemes (i.e. the transaction within which the security is contained) involving risk, and since securities
are basically instruments used to acquire capital, it would appear these
two ideas were correlated by the court with the logical result that risk
capital was equated with those securities which the act was designed to
regulate. Risk capital thus became the element necessary and common
to those items included within the definition of a security under section
25008.
B.

The Definition of a Security

Having articulated the regulatory purpose of the act, the Silver Hills
court still had to answer the crucial question of "whether the sale of such
a membership [came] within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate
Securities Act."'5 7 To make that determination, the court had to construe
the definition of a security in a manner that would fulfill the act's particular purpose. Although prior case law had embraced the "expectation of
profits" rationale in construing section 25008,8 none of the prior decisions evaluated the regulatory purpose of the act in a manner similar to
that undertaken by the court in Silver Hills.5 9 Because of the inclusion of
the concept of risk capital in the court's statement of the purpose of the
act and the definitional section, and the court's statements that "the act
extends even to transactions where capital is placed without expectation
of any material benefits" ' and that "the act does not make profit to the
supplier of capital the test of what is a security, 1 the "expectation of
profits" rationale could no longer suffice as the sole basis for the definition of a security contained within section 25008.
Having seemingly eliminated that rationale as the only basis by which
to construe the definition of a security, the Silver Hills court apparently
relied on the concept of risk capital to define that term. This conclusion
seems to be substantiated by the court's concluding statements and its
decision that the memberships did constitute securities:
Hence the act is as clearly applicable to the sale of promotional
memberships in the present case as it would be had the purchasers
expected their return in some such familiar form as dividends.
Properly so, for otherwise it could too easily be vitiated by inven62
tive substitutes for conventional means of raising risk capital.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis added).
See cases cited note 39 supra.
See cases cited note 39 supra.
55 Cal 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
Id.
Id. at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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Although the Silver Hills court applied the concept of risk capital to
the facts of the case, specifically-used the terms "risk" and "risk capital"
in four passages of the opinion,6 3 and held that the purchase of a membership constituted an investment of risk capital and thus a sale of a
security,6 4 it failed to clarify either which of its references to "risk" or
"risk capital" embodied the precise definition of risk capital or what the
exact scope of each of those references was. As a result of this ambiguity,
legal writers65 and jurists 6 interpreting Silver Hills have posed three
possible definitions of risk capital and potentially of a security under
California law based on the language of the Silver Hills court: (1) initial
or start-up capital; (2) high risk capital; and (3) risked capital. As to
this last interpretation, it is the contention of this comment that the language used to support it has been misconstrued, and a more appropriate
interpretation of that language will be suggested. A further possible definition of a security under California law, aside from the exclusive adoption of one of the risk capital definitions, has been suggested, i.e. that the
Howey test was not completely dispensed with by the Silver Hills court
and that it could be used as an alternate or a supplement to the concept of
risk capital.6 7 The following analysis will consider these four interpretations of how the court in Silver Hills potentially defined a security under
California law.
1. Initialor Start-up Capital
The first possible interpretation defines risk capital as an investment
of capital to initiate or develop a new business venture, limiting the application of the concept solely to those situations in which initial or startup capital is being solicited. In Silver Hills such initial or start-up capital
was being solicited to finance a proposed country club. 8 This solicitation may have been the focus of the court's inquiry since the financing
and establishment of a new business entity would involve a substantial
degree of risk to the investors involved. The court's characterization of
the transactions would seem to support such a conclusion: "Petitioners
are soliciting the risk capitalwith which to develop a business for profit."6 9 Thus the Silver Hills court may have intended that risk capital
63. Id. at 814-16, 361 P.2d at 907-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187-89.
64. Id. at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
65. Mofsky, The Expanding Definition of "Security" Under Blue Sky Laws, 1 Sac.
REo.L.J. 217, 223-24 (1973); Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare To Be Regulated, 61 Gao.
LJ. 1257, 1279 (1973); Note, FranchiseRegulation Under the California CorporateSecuritiesLaw, 5 SAN DiEGo L Rav. 140, 152-55 (1968).
66. S.E.C. v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588, 592 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
1973); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Ore. App. 19, 29 n.10,
482 P.2d 549, 554 n.10 (1971).
67. Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing, supra note 25, at 22.
68. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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would be present only in those situations in which there was an investment or solicitation of initial or start-up capital to develop a business
venture. This initial capital interpretation has received support from
federal and state case law70 as well as from interpretive opinions of
California's Attorney General and Commissioner of Corporations.71
2. High Risk Capital
Under the second possible interpretation risk capital would be defined as an investment of capital in an unsubstantial or unsound enterprise whether or not it was an ongoing venture, thus limiting the concept
to investments or solicitation of "high risk" capital. One appellate court
summarized the following facts from Silver Hills which would appear to
support such an interpretation: The sale of the memberships was not
underwritten; assurances that funds sufficient to construct the facilities
or pay off the land-sales contract were not made; the $400 down-payment by the petitioners was not a significant sum compared to the sum
required for the proposed undertaking; and the investor-members
would suffer the primary monetary loss if the venture were to fail."2
These factors may have prompted the Silver Hills court to view the
scheme as a "high risk" venture. The following language of the court
would seem to support this premise:
We have nothing here like the ordinary sale of a right to use existing facilities. . . . The purchaser's risk is not lessened merely because the interest he purchases is labelled a membership. Only
because he risks his capital along with other purchasers can there
be any chance that the benefits of club membership will materialize. 73
It can be inferred from the court's concern that the facilities might not
materialize that the risky nature of the investment would have been
greatly diminished if the club had been substantially or completely constructed. A recent federal court decision supported this "high risk" capital interpretation as the court held that the risk capital "test" applied only
to "highly speculative" or risky ventures. 74
3. Risked Capital
The third proposed definition of risk capital is derived from one of the
70. See, e.g., Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); State ex
rel. Healy v. Consumer Business System, Inc., 5 Ore. App. 19, 29-31, 482 P.2d 549,
554-56 (1971).
71. See 49 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 124, 128-29 (Cal. 1967); CAL. Div. oF CoRP. BULL.
No. 67-8 (July 14, 1967).
72. Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 2d 224, 233-34, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897, 902 (1970).
73. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (emphasis added).
74. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo.
(1970).
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last passages of the court's opinion in Silver Hills and its last reference to
risk capital:
Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test
of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is
to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capitalin one form or another.75

This "profit is not the test" statement has been interpreted as meaning
that risk capital is present in any transaction in which "capital is invested with less than a fair chance of realizing a return.17 0 This interpretation of the above passage seems to ignore the precise language and
overall rationale employed by the Silver Hills court. By seemingly equating "less than a fair chance" with risk, this interpretation would not only
impose a degree on the amount of risk required for an instrument to be
considered a security (if chance were considered synonymous with
risk), but it might also enable the court to determine not only if a security were present, but also if it were fair. The former result would conflict with the court's use of the term "risk" in an unqualified manner;
the latter would permit the court to encroach upon the administrative
authority designated to the Commissioner of Corporations by the act. 77
As to this latter result, once a transaction involving a security has been
found, it remains for the Commissioner to determine whether or not the
transaction can be qualified. The Commissioner will deny or revoke any
qualification if, inter alia, the proposed issuance or sale of securities
is not "fair,just or equitable," or if the issuer does not intend to transact
its business "fairly and honestly. '78 Thus the interim phrase within the
above passage relating to fairness is necessary since the court is considering the act's objectives and not just those of the definitional section.
As a result the court's statement had to detail the basic requirements of
the act-a security, an offer or sale, and the type of protection which
the act affords to those who risk their capital (i.e. a determination that
once a transaction involving risk capital is found, the fairness of the
factors involved in that investment and the legitimacy of the venture
will be evaluated). Considering separation of powers and valid.delegation of authority, judicial power with respect to any constitutional, legislative act is limited to construction of that act's provisions7" and does not
75. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89 (emphasis
added).

76. Note, Franchise Regulation Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 5
SAN Di o L. REv. 140, 153-54 (1968).
77. See CAL. CoRP. CoDE §25140.

78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., State Dd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d
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extend to usurpation of any discretionary authority that the legislature
has constitutionally delegated under the act to another body; the power
of the court would be limited to a post-action review of the exercise
80
of that authority.
Instead of the prior interpretation, it would seem that the Silver Hills
court intended the above passage, as to that portion relating to securities, to read as follows: the act protects those who "risk their capital...
whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another."81 Read in this manner, the protection of the act would be extended
to capital investments when any risk is involved whether or not the investor's expectations are directed toward material or nonmaterial returns;
further, since the act offers protection whether or not the investor expects a return on his capital, the investor's expectations of profit (i.e. a
return beyond capital invested) need not be considered. This interpretation would also be supported by and supportive of the court's statements
that the act extends its protection to "transactions where capital is placed
without expectations of any material benefits" and that the act does not
make "profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a security.""2
Thus if the court in Silver Hills had utilized this "risked" capital approach, it would have considered all of the factors relevant to a determination of whether there had been any risk. Even though this broad definition of the risk capital concept does not specifically require an
investment of initial or high risk capital, both of those factors, since they
involve risks, could be considered individually or collectively in determining whether risk capital was present. If these or any other factors of
risk to capital were present, the instrument could be characterized as a
security. For example, the Silver Hills court could have found that the
risk in either the investment of initial capital for the development of the
club,83 or the vast discrepancy between the sums contributed by the petitioners and those contributed by the investor-members,8 4 or the possibility that the promised facilities might not materialize 5 would be sufficient to hold that the document being transacted represented risk capital
and was therefore a security. Under this "risked capital" interpretation
the Silver Hills court could have found a security by examining any of
436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953); Lawton v. Board of Medical Examiners, 143 Cal. App. 2d
256, 299 P.2d 362 (1956).
80. See, e.g., Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal. 2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687
(1968).
81. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89 (emphasis
added).
82. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
83. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
84. Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
85. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
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these three factors. However, since the court did not clarify or place a
limitation on the exact scope of its examination,80 it remained for further
clarification, if this interpretation were accurate, what factors of risk
could be considered, only those present at the time of the investment or
those in the future as well; whether the finding of any one particular factor indicating no risk would preclude the examination of other potential
risk factors; and whether all of the factors considered by the Silver Hills
court were necessary to a finding of risk capital.
4. The Howey Test as an Alternative or Supplement
The fourth interpretation of the Silver Hills decision would result in
the utilization of the Howey test as an alternate or supplement to a risk
capital test. The adoption of either the initial or high risk interpretations
of risk capital and the narrow scope of their exclusive application may
create a deficiency in investor protection which has led some to contend
(and even as the Department of Corporations has asserted, that it is
"generally understood") that the Howey "expectation of profits" test is
a necessary alternative to the risk capital approach.8 7 Such an argument
might not be precluded since the Silver Hills court merely rejected "profit to the supplier of capital" as the test of what is a security; 8 thus, argubly, the nature of the "expectations" of the investor was not considered
in this statement nor was "profit to the supplier of capital" rejected as a
test of what is a security under the California law, a result which would
not be possible if the Howey test were used as an alternative to the risk
capital test. This deficiency can be illustrated by positing that if the initial capital interpretation were selected as the exclusive definition of risk
capital over the high risk interpretation, the result would be a finding
that no security existed when the latter type of risk was involved; similarly, even though high risk capital might be a slightly broader definition,
its exclusive use would preclude the finding of a security based solely on
the presence of start-up capital even though that factor alone might have
risks which attend it. As risk capital is a common requirement of all
securities contained within section 25008,89 such a limitation on the
concept of risk capital and the definition of a security would result in
defeating rather than insuring the protective, regulatory purpose of the
act.
However, due to the problems which the use of the Howey test as an
alternative would create, this view would seem to ignore the underlying
86.
87.
88.
89.
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See text accompanying note 56 supra.
Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing, supra note 26, at 22.
55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961).
Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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determination by the Silver Hills court concerning the regulatory purpose of the California act and its definitional section. To begin with, the
use of the term "profit" in Howey seems to limit the form of return (tangible versus intangible) as well as the time and amount of return (return
of money in the future over and above the capital invested). Thus the
basic Howey rationale would only encompass investments made with an
expectation of the return of material benefits beyond the capital actually
invested. Although the Silver Hills court may have limited the situations
in which "risk" to capital was found there was no requirement that a
particular type of return be expected. As the court stated, the act would
protect investments of risk capital regardless of whether the expectations of the investor were directed toward nonmaterialinstead of material benefits. 90
Although the straight Howey rationale was thus too limited to define
the element of risk capital required of all securities contained within
section 25008, the Silver Hills court could have altered the Howey test to
extend the expectations requirement to material or nonmaterial benefits. Under the facts of the Silver Hills case, such an extension of Howey
would have been necessary to support its finding that the memberships
were securities as the investors were not seeking material benefits, but
rather the use of the club facilities." However, even this altered version
of the Howey test would have been an unsatisfactory means of defining a
security as the Silver Hills court had held that the California act requires
a finding that each investment of capital be accompanied by or subjected
to "risk. 9a2 Such a requirement of risk is not part of the Howey rationale
and was specifically rejected by the Howey Court as necessary to satisfying that test.93 Further,the possible definition of "capital" could also
limit the appropriateness of utilizing an altered Howey rationale. If capital were defined as "initial value," 94 the necessity of finding risk capital
might result in an examination of the risks present only to that value
when it was given. If limited in the point of time or the value considered,
examination of return beyond capital invested (profit) would be inappropriate; if unlimited as to the type of risks considered at the time of the
investment, examination of the form of return (material benefits)
90. See text accompanying notes 60-61 supra.
91. 55 Cal. 2d at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
92. Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
93. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
94. This type of analysis seems to form the basis for both that part of Professor
Ronald J. Coffey's definition-test for securities relating to "risk capital" and his determination of what factors create the "risk" necessary to satisfy his test. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Fbrmula?, 18 CAsE W.
REs. L. REV. 367, 374 n.38 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Coffey]. See text accompanying note 167 infra.
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would be irrelevant. Even if the risk capital approach were not limited as
to the time when risk to value was assessed, that is, the necessary risk to
the investment could be considered and found at any time from the moment of the initial investment to the time of return, the Howey test or its
modification would still be insufficient as an alternative test because the
concept of risk capital cannot be applied on a selective basis (i.e. only
when an investor does not expect to receive profit or when he expects to
receive something other than material benefit from his capital investment). Rather, the court's construction of the purpose of section 25008
indicates -thatrisk capital must be applied to and must be present in all
interests to be regulated as securities under the California act.95 Along
with these limitations of a modified version of the Howey test, it must
also be noted that the Silver Hills court did not specifically embark on a
course of modifying the Howey rationale. 0
Although potentially inadequate as an alternative test to define a security under California law, the Howey test might be considered supplemental to any of the interpretations of risk capital, that is, despite other
requirements, the risk to capital element would need to be satisfied in
every regulated transaction. However, this interpretation would result in
an incorporation into the definition of risk capital of those requirements
of Howey which the Silver Hills court found particularly repugnant to
the purpose of the California act-expectation of material benefits or
profit to the supplier of capital-to the exclusion of instances of an expectation of nonmaterial benefits or a return up to the amount of capital
risked. Even if the Howey test were modified to include expectations of
nonmaterial benefit, the use of such a test as supplementary to the risk
capital concept would not result in minimization of the mechanical aspects of a test to define a security.9 7 Rather, the test for a security would
become overwhelmingly cumbersome in its application as the Department of Corporations or the courts would not only have to find an investment of capital attended by risk, but also a specific expectation of a return, regardless of its form, and a particular type of enterprise, before it
could consider an instrument a security.
Before departing from this analysis of the propriety of utilizing the
Howey test under California law, it should also be noted that as to the
broad all-factors risked capital interpretation suggested by this comment, the Howey test would not be required as an alternative test and
only in certain very limited circumstances would it ever be needed as a
95. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187 (1961).
96. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
97. See State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 645-47, 485 P.2d 105,
108 (1971).
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supplemental test. One of the great concerns of those interpreting Silver
Hills has been that a risk capital test alone would not sufficiently protect
investors98 or accomplish the purpose of the act; however, such concerns
have stemmed from potential acceptance of one of the narrower definitions of that concept (either the initial or the high risk capital definitions) being adopted as the test. If the all-factors risked capital approach
were selected, the result would belie such concerns as the approach
would give broad investor protection while dispensing with the mechanical aspects of the Howey test. As stated by the court in Silver Hills
whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another, investors will be protected under the act every time they risk their
capital.09
Although it might be argued that sole reliance on a finding of risk
capital in each transaction regulated by the act would preclude protection in some transactions otherwise protected under the Howey test, it
has been noted that risk capital is the "salient feature" of a security.100
Only if risk were present would there be any need for protection because
only then would the fate of the capital investment be uncertain.
After 1961 California courts applied the risk capital language of Silver Hills in cases which were both factually similar and dissimilar to
Silver Hills. In these cases, either all of the passages referring to risk
capital were included with no differentiation between them,'' or the
court merely cited Silver Hills as support for its holding even when based
on facts dissimilar to that case,' 0 2 or specific language was selected without any revelation as to how the concept was being applied or whether it
embodied the sole "test' under California law. 08 As a result of these
unenlightening decisions it still remained for other judicial decisions to
precisely clarify whether specific language in the Silver Hills decision
embodied a "risk capital test," whether alternative or supplemental
"tests" were precluded under California law, and whether the scope of
any definition chosen was indicated by the Silver Hills court.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

25019:

HAMILTON JEwELERS V. DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS

In 1974 California's Third District Court of Appeal was presented

with a unique factual situation in Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of
98. Cf. Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing, supra note 26, at 26.
99. 55 Cal. 2d at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
100. See State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 648, 485 P.2d 105,
109 (1971).
101. E.g., Clejan v. Reisman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 224, 84 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
102. E.g., People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972).
103. E.g., People v. Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
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Corporations.11 4 In reaching its decision the court applied and attempted to clarify the "test" to be used in defining the securities contained
within section 25019 of the California Corporattions Code. 0 5
A.

The HamiltonDecision

In Hamilton a suit was instituted after the Department of Corporations had asserted that a certain newspaper advertisement which was
made by Hamilton Jewelers, a retail jeweler in Sacramento county, contained an offer to sell an investment contract and an evidence of indebtedness-thus a security as defined under section 25019 of the Corporations Code.1 "
By this newspaper advertisement Hamilton offered to the general
public a selected group of unmounted diamonds ordinarily sold at prices
of $500 or more.' °7 The following portion of the newspaper advertisment was reproduced in the Hamilton decision:
Hamilton Jewelers invites you to invest in a ONE CARAT DIAMOND for only $500, and if anytime [sic] within a three year
period you elect to return the stone, Hamilton will return to you the
full purchase price plus 5% interest calculated daily from the date
of purchase.
A diamond investment of $500 will return $578.81 in cash at the
end of a three year period.108
The Department of Corporations alleged that the advertisement contained an offer for the sale of an investment contract under the test100
announced by the United States Supreme Court in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey
Co., 0 and thus was a transaction requiring qualification under the act.
A literal application of the Howey test to the facts of the case would have
sustained the Department's argument, as the advertisement called for
the investment of money in a common enterprise (the diamonds were to
be purchased for $500 each with a full refund option from Hamilton)
with the expectation of profits to come solely from the efforts of others
(the purchasers were promised a $78 profit after a three year period
without any participation in the business). In support of the applicability of the Howey test, the Department detailed the sources for California's
104. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974).
105. See note 7 supra.
106. Opening Brief for Appellant at 8, 14, Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of
Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's
Opening Brief].
107. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 388.

108. Id.

109. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 106, at 25.

110. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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Corporate Securities Law of 1968,111 with particular emphasis on the
use and influence of the federal definition of a security contained in the
1933 Act."12 The Department contended that due to this influence, federal case law interpreting the definitional section of the 1933 Act and the
interpretive opinions of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(which have advised that schemes similar to the Hamilton advertisement involve securities)" 3 should be valid authority under California
law." 4 Underlying the Department's contention concerning the propriety of applying the Howey test to define a security was the belief that
the proper definition of risk capital limited its application to those
schemes which involved the solicitation of initial, start-up capital in return for nonmaterial benefits."15 Therefore, the Department urged that
the Howey test, which encompassed transactions in which money was
invested with the expectation of profits, was a necessary alternative to
the narrower risk capital approach"16 in order to insure broad investor
protection under the securities law.
Despite the Hamilton court's acknowledgment of the influence of the
definition of security contained within the Federal Securities Act of
1933 on the draftsmen of the California Corporate Securities Law of
1968 and the propriety of looking to federal decisions for guidance in
the interpretation of California's definition of a security, 1 7 the court
turned its attention to the purpose of the California act in order to determine what precedents would actually guide the court in, and serve as
authority for, its decision. To make such a determination,the court needed to resolve" 'whether the transactioncomes within the regulatorypurpose of the Corporate Securities Law.' (Italics added)."" 8 This statement, which was included in the Hamilton decision, was made by the
same court ina prior decision" 9 and represented the court's interpretation of the inquiry stated in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski. 20 In
111. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 106, at 4, citing H. MARSH & R. VOLK,
THE CAL FORNiA CoRPoRATE SF-cunrrms LAw oF 1968, Appendix A,
Draftsmen's Commentary, at 512 (1969).
112. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 106, at 5.
113. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 106, at 18, citing recent interpretive
opinions of the Securities and Exchange Commission which held that proposed offerings similar to the Hamilton advertisement involved securities in the form of investment
contracts. See [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP., 179,151, at 82,504
(SEC 1972); [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP., 178,350, at 80,806
(SEC 1971).
114. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 106, at 5.
115. Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing, supra note 26, at 36.
116. Id.
117. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 333 & n.3, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 388-89 & n.3 (1974).
118. Id. at 334-35, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390, quoting Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co.,
231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 424, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869, 870-71 (1964).
119. Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 421, 424, 41 Cal. Rptr. 869,
870-71 (1964).
120. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
PRACncE UNDm
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assessing the regulatory purpose of the California Securities Law, the
Hamiltoncourt seized on the following language of Silver Hills:
"Section 25008 defines a security broadly to protect the public
against spurious schemes, however ingeniously devised, to attract
risk capital." ...(Italics added.)[1 21J "Since the act does not
make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a security,
it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those who
risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives
in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their
capital in one form or another." . . . (Italics added.)

22

Given this purpose and the principle of stare decisis, the Hamilton
court determined that it was "bound by the 'risk capital' test enunciated
in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski."' 23 In so holding the Hamilton
court went on to state, "California follows the 'risk capital' approach in
ascertaining whether a transaction involves a 'security' within the meaning of the Corporate Securities Law.' ' x2 4 In light of the California Supreme Court's decision to deny the Department of Corporations' petition for a hearing, 25 these two statements by the Hamilton court are
extremely important. To begin with the Hamilton court was the first
California court to hold that the Silver Hills court had enunciated a risk
capital "test."' 26 Additionally, such a holding implies that a risk capital
test can be derived from the language of the Silver Hills opinion. This
result, coupled with the specific and sole language selected by the Hamilton court from the Silver Hills opinion, is critical to the analysis of the
court's decision.
Bound to apply the risk capital test, the Hamilton court commenced
an examination of particular facts of the case. The court accepted the
trial court's finding that the diamonds were "'ordinarily sold at prices
of $500.00 or more.' 127 To resolve any ambiguity, the court construed that finding "to be a determination of the fair market value of the
individual gem if sold without the full-refund-plus-interest warranty.",2 8 Appararently, the court was separating the value of the diamond
from the right to refund with interest. Consequently, since the value of
the diamond equalled the purchase price, the court held:
121. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 335, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390, quoting Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 814, 361 P.2d 906, 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187 (1961).
122. Id. at 335, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390, quoting Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.
55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961).
123. Id. at 335 n.4, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.4 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 335, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
125. Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
126. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
127. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1974).
128. Id. at 335-36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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The customer, being adequately secured, would have placed no
"risk capital" with Hamilton; and therefore, the transaction would
not come within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate Securities
Law even though 5 percent interest might ultimately be paid to the
customer.'

29

Further, the court concluded by stating:
The fully secured status of the investor in Hamilton's promotional
plan distinguishes this case from others where unsecured or undersecured promissory notes bearing fixed rates of interest have been
held to be securities. . . . Moreover, this case is unlike State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,t130o . . . where the sums invested
were disproportionately greater than the wholesale value of the
13
merchandise purchased. '
In support of the statement that the secured status of the investor is a
crucial factor in determining whether or not a security exists, the Hamilton court cited the California case of People v. Walberg.12 In Walberg
the pastor of a church solicited loans of money, for which he offered six
percent interest.133 Since no property was given as security in return for
the loans, the court in Walberg found that the unsecured notes constituted securities in stating:
Although the Silver Hills case deals with a security which is very
different from that involved here, the court's generalization is applicable: The Corporate Securities Act is designed to regulate the
transactions by which promoters go to the public for risk capital.
A public offering of unsecured notes falls easily within that statu34
tory purpose.
The Hamilton court also distinguished the "fully-secured" status of
the investor in the case before it from that of an "under-secured" investor
by referring to the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in State v.
Hawaii Market Center, Inc.' In Hawaii Market a corporation planned
to open a retail store which was to serve only those persons possessing
purchase authorization cards. The initial capitalization of the venture
was limited to $1,000; the balance of the necessary capital was to come
from the sale of founder memberships. In return for the membership,
the purchaser received (1) either a sewing machine or a cookware set,
the wholesale value of which was only a fraction of the invested capital,
and (2) the promise of future income if the members participated in one
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis added).
52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
37 Cal. App. 3d at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
263 Cal. App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
Id. at 287-88, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
Id. at 294, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
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of the promotional schemes outlined by the corporation. 3 " In light of
the comparison undertaken in Hamilton, it is likely that the court would
have found the investor in the HawaiiMarket case to be "under-secured"
since the purchasers received goods the fair market value of which was
not equal to the capital invested.
Before further discussion of the Hamilton decision is undertaken, a
cursory reading of the case reveals three important facts: (1) California
follows the risk capital approach or test in ascertaining whether a security is involved in a transaction; 3 7 (2) a risk capital test was enunciated
by the California Supreme Court in Silver Hills;138 and (3) the Hamilton court applied the risk capital test to the facts before it. 30 Although
the Hamilton court applied a risk capital test, the factors taken into consideration under such a test must still be identified. The remaining portion of this section will be devoted to the identification and definition of
the risk capital test as currently applied under California law.
B.

The Risk CapitalTest
Read in conjunction, the Silver Hills and Hamilton decisions (with
the latter's references to the Hawaii Market case) 4 ' may provide the
answers to the questions that have surrounded the concept of risk capital
since the Silver Hills case. Initially, however, an examination of whether
the Hamilton court selected the appropriate passage from Silver Hills
embodying the risk capital test should be undertaken. In support of the
premise that the "profit is not the test" quotation contains that test is the
fact that the Silver Hills court seemed to have used that passage as a
general or definitional statement concerning the concept of risk capital.
This interpretation is substantiated by the absence of any reference to
the facts of the Silver Hills case in this "explanatory statement," in contrast to the specific references to the facts found in the passages of the
opinion which support the narrower interpretations of risk capital.' 4' It
is possible to infer that these other references to risk and risk capital only
represented the Silver Hills court's application of the risk capital test to
the facts or its revelation of when the test was satisfied under the particular facts before it. Further, by specifically stating in an introductory
clause that profit to the supplier of capital is not the test of what is a
security, 142 the Silver Hills court may have been implying that the remainder of the statement did embody the "test."
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 643-44, 485 P.2d at 107.
See text accompanying note 124 supra.
37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335 n.4, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 n.4 (1974).
Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
Id. at 335-36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
See text accompanying notes 69 and 73 supra.
55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
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In order to determine how this passage and thus risk capital were
interpreted under Silver Hills and Hamilton, the remainder of this section will examine the factors that may indicate the presence of risk capital; by excluding and including certain factors, the present meaning of
risk capital will be determined. As a starting point in attempting to ascertain these factors, an analysis of the status of "profit" under the risk
capital test would seem proper in light of the Department of Corporations' contention that the Howey formula was an appropriate test under
1 43
California law.
The Silver Hills court specifically stated that "the [securities] act does
not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a security,' 4 4
and the Hamilton court reiterated that statement. 1 45 In both situations it
seems that the term "profit" was being used in the traditional sense of
material returns that exceed the capital invested. This traditional use of
profit (as in the Howey test) presents analytical problems in the Silver
Hills case, as the investor-members were given the right to use the future
club, rather than the right to share in any profit of the club. 1 48 It is difficult to determine if the intangible benefit (the right to use the facilities)
is in fact profit in the form of value returned beyond the capital invested.
In the absence of a determination of the presence of profit in such a
situation, one is left with the Silver Hills court's statement concerning
profit as the sole indication of whether it is a relevant consideration
1 47
under any definition of risk capital.
In terms of the relevancy of profit to "risk capital," the Hamilton case
provides a much better basis for analysis. In contrast to the Silver Hills
setting, Hamilton's customers were promised a five percent return on
their investment.' 48 In assessing the presence of risk capital, the Hamilton court made two statements which reinforce the premise that profit is
not a relevant consideration under the risk capital test: (1) In referring
to the value of the diamond, the court stated that "we construe the finding to be a determination of the fair market value of the individual gems
if sold without the full-refund-plus-interest warranty", 49 and (2) in
referring to the scheme before it, the court stated that "the transaction
would not come within the regulatory purpose of the Corporate Securities Law even though 5 percent interest might be ultimately paid."'' 0
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Petitioner's Brief for a Hearing, supra note 26, at 10.
See text accompanying note 75 supra.
See text accompanying 122 supra
55 Cal. 2d 811, 813, 361 P.2d 906, 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187 (1961).
See text accompanying note 75 supra.
37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 332, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 388 (1974).
Id. at 335-36, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis added).
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Although the first statement concerns both the refund and profit elements of the plan, it would appear that the court was assessing the fair
market value of the gem without any consideration of the right to collect
a profit on the redemption date. Similarly, in the second quotation the
court specifically excluded the five percent profit that was promised
from its consideration as to whether or not the transaction fell within the
regulatory purpose of the California law. Therefore, the common language of the two cases, the factual situation in Hamilton, the Hamilton
court's apparent disregard for profit, and the refusal to apply the Howey
test proposed by the Department of Corporations support the rejection
of the concept of "expectation of profit" as a factor to be considered in
the identification of a security under the risk capital approach. This
analysis would also support the conclusion that the Howey test was rejected as an alternative or supplemental test under California law.
Since profit to the supplier of capital was not considered by either
court, one must turn to the factors which were apparently considered.
In Silver Hills, the court considered a number of factors: (1) solicitation of initial capital, 15' (2) the vast discrepancy between the investments of the investor-members and the promoters, 52 and (3) the absence of existing facilities.' 5 3 As previously discussed, 154 standing
alone, the Silver Hills case would support arguments that the presence
of any one of these factors would be sufficient for a finding of risk capital (hence an all-factors test) or, alternatively, that one specific factor
would be required in order to find risk capital (hence one of the narrower initial capital or high risk capital tests). However, when the Hamilton decision is also considered, it is apparent that factors other than
those examined in Silver Hills are relevant to a determination of the
presence of risk capital. In applying the risk capital test, both the fact
that the Hamilton court did not refer to a solicitation of start-up capital
or to the financial status of the business and the specific language
chosen from Silver Hills by the Hamilton court 51 indicate that the risk
capital test is an all-factors, rather than a single factor (either start-up
capital or high risk capital, but not both) or a limited factor (only startup capital and high risk capital) test. Such an "all-factors" test has been
previously suggested by this comment based on an interpretation of the
same language.' 56
Additional support for the all-factors risk capital interpretation of the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (1961).
Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
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See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
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test is provided by the Hamilton court's decision to focus on the "secured
157
status" of the purchasers involved in the facts before it;
hence it would
seem that still another factor had been identified as relevant to a determination of the presence of risk capital. However, the Hamilton court's
decision to limit its inquiry solely to the secured status of the purchaser
could also be considered as contravening that "all-factors" interpretation since, as previously posited, a court adopting this interpretation
would have to examine all relevant factors that would bear upon a finding of risk. The Hamilton court did have access to other factors that
could have also been used to refute the presence of risk; however, the
court failed to review them in its decision. 1, 8 In fact the court specifically
stated that Hamilton's proposed plan "to deposit into a trust account
one-fifth of the proceeds of all sales effected pursuant to its advertisement, to assure payment to the 'minor number' of purchasers who it was
anticipated would exercise their refund options," was an irrelevant consideration in its decision. 159 If this risked capital interpretation is to find
support in the Hamilton opinion, the court's decision not to examine
other factors relating to the use of the capital or the risks of the enterprise
must be explained.
One possible explanation for this apparent contradiction may be
gleaned from the Hamilton court's use of State v. Hawaii Market Center,
Inc., 60 and the definitional test for a security that was applied in that
case. 6" In determining that California follows the risk capital approach,
the Hamiltoncourt cited Hawaii Market as a decision in accordance with
that approach.16 2 In light of this citation and the court's later reference to
the facts of Hawaii Market,16 s it would appear that the Hamilton court
considered the Hawaii Supreme Court's adopted definition of risk capital in determining what factors were to be examined in order to identify
risk to capital invested under California law.
The court in Hawaii Market based its "risk capital approach"' 6 4 on a
test 5 proposed by Professor Ronald J.Coffey, 166 a noted authority in
157. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335-36, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1974).
158. The Department of Corporations conceded that Hamilton Jewelers was a successful and reputable business during the initial declaratory relief proceedings. Defendant's Points and Authorities inOpposition to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief
at 13, Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., No. 218710 (Super. Ct., Sacto.
County, Sept. 22, 1972).
159. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 336 n.5, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 n.5 (1974).
160. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
161. Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
162. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1974).
163. Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
164. 52 Hawaii at 648, 485 P.2d at 109.
165. Id. at 648 n.5, 485 P.2d at 109 n.5.
166. Coffey, supra note 94, at 377.
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the field of securities law. In his article on the economic realities of a
security, Coffey interprets this concept of risk capital to require risk to
initial investment or value, which terms, he states, "relate to the money,
property, or services furnished by the alleged 'buyer' to the alleged 'seller' in the first step of the purported 'security' transaction."' 6 7 However,
Coffey's test, unlike that used in California, necessitates not only a showing that there is risk to initial value, but also, as stated by the court in
Hawaii Market, a showing that "the furnishing of the initial value is
induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give risk to a
reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise."' 68 Nevertheless, as the Coffey test is based upon
the concept of risk to capital invested 69 his analysis of the requirement
of risk capital might be considered beneficial by California courts interpreting California's risk capital test. In his article Coffey specifically
enumerates the situations in which risk capital would be present.17 0 For
example, the factual situation in Hawaii Market fell squarely within
Coffey's fifth description of risk capital (capital invested in return for
property with a fair market value less than the sum invested)'1 ' while an
application of the fourth description would have revealed risk capital in
the Silver Hills case (capital invested in return for a membership in the
yet-unrealized success of an enterprise). 172 After enunciating the five
situations in which there is risk to capital invested, Coffey considered the
possibility of a situation in which there would be an absence of risk to the
capital invested: 'iIlt appears rather certain that the expectation of
'profits' will not cause a transaction to be a security where the buyer has
not furnished initial value which is in some way subjected to the risks of
an enterprise."'1 73 Coffey elaborated on this situation in a footnote, stating:
This [where there was no subjection to risk] would be the situation
in which the buyer receives property which is not a proprietary interest or a creditor's claim, which is not recommitted for use by an
enterprise, and which has a present fair market value (no part of
which is determined by taking into account the anticipated but unaccomplished success of an enterprise) equal to the buyer's original
investment.' 74
167.
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170.
171.
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174.
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As the quotation above essentially describes the factual situation in
the Hamilton case (with the exception of the refund option), this type of
rationale may have pervaded the Hamilton court's conception of the factors which could be considered in ascertaining the presence of risk capital. Hence the court may have been in accord with Coffey's analysis,
although never citing it, in finding that an investment of capital in return
for tangible property which has a fair market value equal to the sum
invested and which is not recommitted to the enterprise precludes the
finding of risk capital and thus a security.
If such is the case, when read together, the Silver Hills and Hamilton
decisions seem to set forth the following guidelines for identifying risk
capital. A court's first consideration would involve the nature of the
property (tangible versus intangible) which is received in return for the
capital that is invested. If the investor receives tangible property, the
court's only concern is whether or not the investor is "fully secured" in
the sense that he receives and retains property whose fair market value
equals the amount of capital invested. In that case the court would not
look at the "secured status" of the investor beyond the time of the investment. If the investor is "fully-secured," a finding of risk capital is precluded; however, if the investor is under-secured or unsecured, risk
capital would be present and the powers of the Commissioner of Corporations would be activated. 7 ' In a situation where the investor receives intangible property (e.g., a percentage share of the assets of an
enterprise, a right to use facilities, a creditor's claim)176 in return for
capital, the court would consider all relevant factors in determining the
presence or absence of risk capital at the time of the investment, as
did the court in Silver Hills. These factors might include the nature
of the enterprise, the use to which the invested capital is put, and any
additional factors which bear upon the risk to capital at the time of investment. Thus in Hamilton the nature of the item for which the capital
was exchanged became a critical factor to be added to those which determine whether risk capital is present. 77
If this analysis properly describes the factors that would be considered
in any given transaction, the risk capital test would be an all-factors test,
except in situations in which the investor receives and retains property
equal to the capital invested. Further, the test would only protect the
investor from risks to capital at the time of investment, as protection of
profit to the supplier of capital is outside the regulatorypurpose of the
175. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25140.

176. For a further discussion of "intangible property" see Coffey, supra note 94, at
384-96.
177. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1974).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 6

act. Hence, the Hamilton court's findings that the purchasers were fully
secured, that no risk capital was invested with Hamilton, and that the
transaction was beyond the regulatory purpose of the securities law even
though the expected five percent interest might ultimately be received,17 8 seems in accord with the holding in Silver Hills.
Although extremely limited in its application, there is one possible
criticism of the present "factors" approach. It arises in redemption-plusprofits transactions, the type of transaction involved in the Hamilton
case. Putting aside the element of profit, the limited inquiry apparently
permitted by California's risk capital test in such situations, which disregards all factors except the secured status of the investor, would seemingly fail to truly assess the risk to an investment of capital. Although the
investor has received tangible property which equals the value of the
investment, if he elects to exercise the refund option, he retains that
property only until the redemption date. While the risk capital test allows consideration of the value of the property received on the date of the
investment, it ignores the fact that the only "guaranteed" market for the
property on the redemption date is the seller and that the fair market
value of the property may not equal the purchase price on that date.
The investor in essence is relying on the existence of the seller and his
enterprise in order to redeem the property for the capital invested. Thus
the risk capital test as applied in this situation does not allow an examination of the risks that may surround the realization of the return of the
initial investment itself, regardless of an expectation of profits. Therefore, in order to truly assess the risks that may attend the investment of
capital in these situations, it would seem that the all-factors examination
which is utilized in intangible property transactions should also be applied in the "secured", tangible-property-redemption-plus-profit transactions. This would allow the courts to consider the element of risk to the
capital invested from the time of the investment through the date scheduled for redemption. Had this examination been permitted in Hamilton,
the court could well have reached the same end result, as the successful
and reputable nature of Hamilton's business and its use of the capital
might have still precluded the finding of risk capital, 17 but it would have
provided a broader test to be utilized in the future.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of the method adopted, the purpose of securities regulation has been to provide broad investor protection. This purpose has
178. See 2 H. BALLANTiNE & G. STEOlNG, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
§435.02, at 850 n.22.1 (4th ed. 1975).
179. See note 158 supra. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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occasionally been particularized depending on the specific method of
regulation adopted under a given securities act and has primarily been
realized through the judicial construction of the statutory definition of a
security. Given a unique factual situation in Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, the California Supreme Court assessed the regulatory purpose
of the California corporate securities law and its definitional section to
require protection of the public from spurious schemes devised to attract
risk capital. However, the court failed to specifically designate or concretely define the concept of risk capital which it devised and which it
found to be a common element of those interests included within the
statutory definition of a security.
Faced with the Silver Hills precedent and the alternatives for which
this somewhat ambiguous decision allowed, the California Third District Court of Appeal in Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corporations held that a risk capital test was to be employed in defining a security
under California law and broadly defined that test'to encompass all
transactions in which there were present factors of risk to capital at the
time of the investment. In this adherence to the Silver Hills decision and
the interpretation of the risk capital test adopted by the Hamilton court is
the rejection of the "expectation of profits" test utilized by the United
States Supreme Court in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co. as an alternative or
supplementary test to define a security under California law or as a factor in that definition. Although Hamilton might be criticized for this
result, given the precedent by which the appellate court was bound and
the method of regulating securities under California law, the test adopted by Hamilton appears to be broad enough to accomplish the present
purposes of the California securities law. Further, this approach would
appear to exemplify the current status of the definition of a security in
California in light of the California Supreme Court's denial of the Department of Corporations' petition for a hearing. 1' °
Any deficiency or criticism of the current California approach for
defining a security may be traced to the gloss placed on the purpose of
the California act and its definitional section in Silver Hills. As to this
possibility, it should be noted that the legislature impliedly approved the
decision in Silver Hills by exempting from qualification rather than excluding from the definition of a security memberships issued by nonprofit social organizations. 1" However, whether or not the last interpre180. 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387, 391 (1974).
181. See CAL. CORP. CODE §25100(j); H. MARSH & R. VOLE, PRACTICE UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA CoRpoR&E SEcuRrms LAw, Appendix A-1-148, Draftsmen's Commentary
to §25100(j), Appendix A-4-41-44, Dep't of Corps. Release No. 15-C, May 15, 1970
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tation of the definition of a security under California law set forth by the
Hamilton court adequately and realistically protects the California
investor is left by this comment to the scrutiny of other commentators
and perhaps the legislature itself.

David Merritt Roberts

